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Some Problems Regarding Price in the
Louisiana Law of Sales
PAUL M. HEBERT* AND CARLOS E. LAZARUSt
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870:
Art. 2439. The contract of sale is an agreement by which
one gives a thing for a price in current money, and the other gives
the price in order to have the thing itself.
Art. 2456. The sale is considered to be perfect between the
parties, and the property is of right acquired to the purchaser
with regard to the seller, as soon as there exists an agreement for
the object and for the price thereof, although the object has not
yet been delivered nor the price paid.
Art. 2464. The price of the sale must be certain, that is to
say, fixed and determined by the parties.
It ought to consist of a sum of money, otherwise it would be
considered as an exchange.
It ought to be serious, that is to say, there should have been a
serious and true agreement that it should be paid.
It ought not to be out of all proportion with the value of the
thing; for instance the sale of a plantation for a dollar could not
be considered as a fair sale; it would be considered as a donation
disguised.
Art. 2465. The price, however, may be left to the arbitration
of a third person; but if such person can not, or be unwilling to
make the estimation, there exists no sale. (Italics supplied.)
INTRODUCTION '
The consensual contract of sale of the civil law first made its
appearance in the Roman law' and, although there is a divergence
of opinion as to its source, it is clear that it "began by being an
exchange in which the parties carried out their respective parts of
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1. G. 3.135, 136 [1 Scott, The Civil Law (1932) 169]; I. 3.22.1 [2 Scott, op




the bargain simultaneously and left no obligations outstanding. '2
This contract was known as emptio venditio and was binding on
the parties as soon as there was a definite agreement as to the
thing and the price.8 Since it was a consensual contract, no partic-
ular form was necessary and consent could be shown in any man-
ner, except when the parties had agreed that the contract should
be reduced to writing, in which case there was no binding agree-
ment until the instrument was completed.4 Thus, three things
were necessary for the conclusion of the contract: the thing, the
price, and the consent.
That a price in money was necessary to constitute a contract
of sale was very early decided. In the Institutes of Gaius, refer-
ence is made to a controversy as to whether exchange was or was
not a species of sale.5 Paulus was of the opinion that there could
not be a sale unless there was a price in money, for otherwise it
would be impossible to determine which party should be consid-
ered the buyer and which the seller.6
Furthermore, it was necessary that the price be fixed," for
there could not be a sale without a price. As a corollary, this re-
quired that the price be expressed with certainty.' However, by
virtue of the maxim "id certum est quod certum reddi potest" the
price was said to be certain, although not actually expressed in a
stated sum of money, if what was really promised was susceptible
of ascertainment, for example, if a thing was sold at the current
market price.9
There was considerable controversy as to the validity of a
sale in which the price was left to be fixed by a third person.
Justinian ruled that
"The contract shall stand under the following conditions,
namely, that if he who is mentioned shall establish the price
it shall be paid in every instance in accordance with his esti-
mate, and the property shall be delivered so that the sale shall
2. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (1932)
298.
3. G. 3.139 [1 Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 170]; I. 3.23.pr. [2 Scott, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 120].
4. 1.3.23.pr. [2 Scott, op.cit. supra note 1, at 121]; Buckland, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 278, § 107.
5. G.3.141 [1 Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 170]. See also 1.3.23.2 [2 Scott,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 121, 122].
6. D.18.1.1.1 [5 Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3, 4].
7. 1.3,23.1 [2 Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 121].
8. Ibid.; G.3.140 [1 Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 170].
9. Buckland, op. cit. supra note 1, at 281, § 108; Moyle, The Contract of
Sale in the Civil Law (1892) 68.
1942]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
be accomplished; ... but if the party mentioned is either un-
willing or unable to fix the price, then the sale shall be void,
because no price was determined upon .... -""
Roman law exacted an additional condition regarding the
price-that it should be serious; otherwise, the price was con-
sidered derisive and the transaction regarded as a gift.1' But a dis-
tinction was made between a derisive price and an inadequate
price. To be a valid sale, the price did not need to be adequate;
the parties were at perfect liberty to make their own bargains and
the mere fact that the price did not represent the equivalent of the
thing sold did not invalidate the transaction."2 In cases in which
land was sold, however, an exception was made by the rule of
laesio enormis which provided for the rescission of the contract
by the seller if the land were sold for less than one-half of its fair
value. 13
It is significant that the modern civil law of sales, as embodied
in the Code Napoleon and in its offspring the Louisiana Civil
Code, still adheres to these briefly enumerated basic principles of
Roman law. The civil law of sales is broad in scope, including not
merely sales of goods, wares and merchandise, but also embracing
sales of immovables and incorporeal rights. Consequently, the
principles governing price, reflected in the articles of the Louisi-
ana Civil Code set forth above, take on added importance in rela-
tion to the broader scope of the sales transaction. It has been well
stated by Professor Llewellyn that price, viewed from an eco-
nomic standpoint, "is the heart of the sales contract." 14 The tradi-
tional emphasis upon the importance of price aAd its certainty,
flowing from the Roman law to the modern civil codes, illustrates
that price is equally important from the legal point of view since,
in accordance with the definition, there cannot be a sale without
a price, although contracts of a different nature may result from
agreements which fall short of the standards required for the
sale transaction. Accordingly, it is the purpose of this article to
discuss some of the problems of price in the Louisiana law of sale
with a particular view to testing whether the legal rules are elas-
,10. 1.3.23.1 [2 Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 121].
11. D.18.1.36.pr. [5 Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 13].
12. D.18.1.38.pr. [5 Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 13]; Buckland, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 280, § 108.
13. C.4.44.2 [13 Scott, op. cit. supra note 1, at 100]; Buckland, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 281, § 108.
14. Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on Sales (1930) 1.
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tic enough to meet the exigencies of modern economy and busi-
ness practices.15
A. PRICE PAYABLE IN MONEY
The feature that distinguishes the contract of sale from all
other contracts for the transfer of property is the element of price
which must be a sum of money.16 It is fundamental that if the
consideration for the transfer of property is anything but money,
the transaction is not a sale but a contract of a different kind ac-
cording to the nature of the consideration. If other property is
given, the transaction is an exchange; 17 if the transfer is made for
a sum which is due and owing, it becomes a dation en paiement;1'
if it is given in payment for services rendered or to be rendered,
it is considered a remunerative donation.19
The importance of these differences cannot be overempha-
sized since not only the rights and liabilities of the parties, but
also the formalities necessary for the validity of such contracts,
depend entirely upon the nature of each particular agreement.
Thus, a "sale" for which no price is expressed or given will be
upheld as a donation only when the act is in proper form and the
parties are not respectively incapable of giving or receiving by
donation.20 Similarly, it is apparently necessary to determine
15. In the following discussion no distinction will be made between a con-
tract to sell (whereby the seller promises to sell to the buyer in the future)
and a contract of sale (in which the property in the thing sold is presently
transferred to the buyer) since both contracts are governed by the same
rules.
16. Arts. 2456, 2464, La. Civil Code of 1870; 10 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6
Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1932) 28, no 35; 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et
Saignat, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, De la Vente et de
L'Echange (3 ed. 1906) 124, no 127. At common law, payment may be made in
commodities as well as in money. Uniform Sales Act § 9(2); Selznick v.
Holmes Pittsburgh Automobile Co., 275 Pa. 1, 118 Atl. 553 (1922). But even at
common law, the contract is not a sale if the consideration therefor consists
of services to be rendered. Haag v. Klee, 162 Misc. 250, 293 N.Y. Supp. 266
(1936).
17. Art. 2660, La, Civil Code of 1870.
18. Art. 2655, La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. Art. 1523, La. Civil Code of 1870. Ackerman v. Larner, 116 La. 101, 40
So. 581 (1906); Robinson v. Guedry, 181 So. 882 (La. App. 1938). Article 1523 of
the Louisiana Civil Code, distinguishing between gratuitous donations and the
so-called remunerative and onerous donations, has no counterpart in the Code
Napoleon. Whatever the nature of these contracts, it is clear that they are
not real donations when the purpose of the transfer is to recompense the
transferee for services which he has rendered. See Arts. 1524, 1525, La. Civil
Code of 1870; 10 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Colin, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique
de Droit Civil, 1 Des Donations Entre Vifs et Testaments (3 ed. 1905) 515, nos
1135, 1136. Accordingly, it is not only misleading but erroneous to refer to
such transfers as donations for such transactions are in effect commutative
contracts of a different nature. But the term "remunerative or onerous dona-
tions" is widely used both here and in France.
20. Holmes v. Patterson, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 393 (La. 1818); D'Orgenoy v. Droz,
13 La. 382 (1839). See also Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888).
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whether a contract is a remunerative donation or a dation en paie-
ment; in the latter there must be a fixed price,21 but this require-
ment has been held unnecessary for the validity of a remunera-
tive donation.22 One important difference between a sale and a da-
tion en paiement is that the latter is perfect only upon delivery,2"
from which it follows that the risk of the thing given in payment
never falls upon the creditor before delivery, unless he has de-
layed beyond a reasonable time to obtain it.2 4
Our courts do not seem to have been called upon to determine
the true nature of the contracts involved in the cases presented,
perhaps because it has frequently been unnecessary for the deci-
sion to determine whether the transactions were real sales.2 5 There
has been dictum to the effect that a pre-existing debt for services
rendered will support a sale if the parties fix the amount due and
agree upon this as the price; 26 and in at least one instance the
supreme court upheld a sale in which the actual "price" was the
21. Art. 2659, La. Civil Code of 1870; Kleinpeter v. Harrigan, 21 La. Ann.
196 (1869); Pulford v. Dimmick, 107 La. 403, 31 So. 879 (1902).
22. Hearsey v. Craig, 126 La. 824, 53 So. 17 (1910); Robinson v. Guedry,
181 So. 882 (La. App. 1938). In Robinson v. Guedry (181 So. at 884), the court
stated: "Council for plaintiff, however, say that in a dation en paiement, as in
a contract of sale, it is essential that the price of the thing given be fixed
and that since in the act of donation the value of the services are not fixed,
it is void because a remunerative donation is, in effect, a dation en paiement.
RCC Arts. 2656, 2658 and 2659. The fallacy of this argument is that while the
principle relied upon has application to sales and to a dation en paiement, it
does not apply to remunerative donations."
It must be pointed out in this connection that the so-called remunerative
donation is in reality a donation when the services rendered are not appre-
ciable in money. In order to become a remunerative donation in the generally
accepted meaning of the term, it is essential that the services rendered be
susceptible of a pecuniary evaluation for, otherwise, it would be impossible
to determine, according to the provisions of Articles 2524, 2525 of the Civil
Code, when the transfer comes within the definition. As such, then, the trans-
fer is more in the nature of a dation en paiement than a real donation. See
10 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Colin, op. cit. supra note 19, at 515, no 1135. In
fact, our supreme court has consistently held that a remunerative donation
constitutes in effect a dation en paiement. Succession of Henry, 158 La. 516,
104 So. 310 (1925). Such being the case, the soundness of the decision of the
court in the Guedry case is questionable.
23. Art. 2656, La. Civil Code of 1870.
24. Art. 2657, La. Civil Code of 1870.
25. Levert v. Hebert, 51 La. Ann. 221, 25 So. 118 (1899); Pulford v. Dim-
mick, 107 La. 403, 31 So. 879 (1902); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Willis, 183
La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935). Cf. Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 231, 3 So.
728, 729 (1882), in which the court stated:
"For the purposes of the decree which we propose to render in the cause,
it is perhaps immaterial to specifically define the contract which is herein
assailed. But as precision -is always desirable in announcing judicial con-
clusions, we feel impelled to hold that under the evidence the true nature of
the contract was an onerous donation inter vivos .. "
26. Pulford v. Dimmick, 107 La. 403, 31 So. 879 (1902).
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obligation of the purchaser to support the seller during his life-
time.27
The failure of the decisions to distinguish clearly between
sales and other contracts is most unfortunate for, as already indi-
cated, the ultimate rights of the parties usually depend not upon
Whether there is a binding contract but upon the true character
thereof.
Price in Commodities Having Current Value
If the price is expressed in terms of commodities having a
ready market value appreciable in money, the contract should be
an exchange and not a sale, regardless of what the parties have
chosen to call it. The French commentators, despite the absence
of a "money requirement" in the articles of the French Civil
Code,28 are almost unanimously agreed that a contract is not a
sale unless a price in money is paid or agreed upon.29 Marcad6 and
Duranton, however, are of the opinion that it suffices if the price
be expressed in terms of any commodity the value of which is
readily estimated in money, as for example, if the price be ex-
pressed in terms of corn, wheat or any other commodity listed in
the stock exchanges. ° However, the majority of the authors point
out that such a rule Would be unworkable because whenever one
of the objects exchanged has acquired a given evaluation,"" it
would then be necessary to label a transaction a sale even though
it was in reality an exchange. By virtue of the strict requirement
of Article 2439, the prevailing French rule would undoubtedly be
followed in Louisiana.
Price in the Form of Services
Under the provisions of the French Civil Code a contract
whereby a person transfers a thing to another on condition that
the latter should support the former during his life is not re-
garded as a sale because no price in money is stipulated, nor as
an exchange because there has not been a reciprocal transfer of
"things." Such a contract is classed under the category of "in-
27. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Willis, 183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935).
28. Art. 1591, French Civil Code: "Le prix doit Otre determfn6 et designd
par les parties."
29. 5 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1907) 13, § 349 c;
19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16, at 124-126, nos 127,
128; 10 Huc, Commentaire Th~orique et Pratique du Code Civil (1897) 54, no
34; 24 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (1877) 77-79, nos 68-70; 10
Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 16, at 28, no 35.
30. 16 Duranton, Cours de Droit Frangais (3 ed. 1834) 154, no 119; 6 Mar-
cad6, Explication Th~orique et Pratique du Code Civil (7 ed. 1875) 182 et seq.
31. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerle et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16, at 125, no 128.
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nominate contracts" in which the acquirer's obligation is simply
an obligation to do.8 2 In Louisiana such transfers are generally
held to constitute remunerative or onerous donations 83
Price in the Form of Annuities
Although the price must necessarily be a sum of money, it is
generally agreed by the French commentators that if the price be
paid in the form of an annuity it will satisfy the requirements. 4
The consideration for the transfer is still money, though it is to
be paid out of the revenues produced from the thing itself. Such
transactions have been upheld as valid sales in Louisiana.2
Price Partly in Money and Partly in Some Other Consideration
When the consideration for the transfer consists of both a
price in money and something else, the determination of the char-
acter of the contract, according to the French jurisprudence, de-
pends upon the nature of the predominant factor; doubts are
resolved in favor of a sale, because it is the contract most in use."
Similarly, if the consideration for the transfer is either a price or
a thing, the French law makes determination of the nature of the
contract depend upon whether the transferor accepted the one or
the other."
Once the parties have agreed as to the thing and as to a price
in money, the contract is a sale. If the purchaser is afterwards
unable to pay and he gives a thing in payment of the price, this
fact does not change the nature of the contract, for the thing is
then given as a dation en paiement for the obligation of the
price.-8
Innominate Contracts
Some contracts transfer the ownership of things; yet because
32. See authorities cited in note 29, supra. See also 5 Troplong, Le Droit
'Civil Explique (5 ed. 1856) 192, no 148.
33. Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888). See note 4, supra.
34. See authorities in note 29, supra.
35. Rudolf v. Gerdy, 121 La. 477, 46 So. 598 (1908).
36. 16 Duranton, op. cit. supra note 30, at 153, no 18; 1 Guillouard, Traitds
de la Vente & de l'Echange (1890) 112, no 94(I); 10 Huc, op. cit. supra note 29,
at 55, no 34.
By virtue of Article 1446 of the Spanish Civil Code, if the price of the
sale should consist partly in money and partly in some other thing, the nature
of the contract is primarily determined by the manifest intention of the par-
ties; failing this, the contract will be considered an exchange or barter if the
value of the thing given exceeds that of the money, and as a sale, if the
contrary is shown. 10 Manresa, Comentarios al C6digo Civil Espanol (4 ed.
1931) 13 et seq. Identical provisions are found in the Philippine Code, Art.
1446.
37. 6 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 30, at 185.
38. Id. at 184; 5 Troplong, op. cit. supra note 32, at 191, 192, no 147.
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of their peculiar nature, they cannot be classed under any of the
categories of contracts known to the law. These contracts are nev-
ertheless valid and enforceable. Reference has already been made
to such innominate contracts in the French law regarding a trans-
fer of property in return for the obligation of the transferee to
support the transferor during his life.39
Of particular importance in this connection is a contract
which is not strictly a contract of sale because of the absence of a
fixed price, but is nevertheless said to transfer the ownership of
a thing "sold" and to subject the "purchaser" to the payment of a
specified price.40 In the case of H. T. Cottam & Company v.
Moises 41 the plaintiffs "sold" and delivered to the defendant a lot
of merchandise which the defendant refused to accept. Plaintiffs
resold the merchandise at a loss and then sued the defendant for
the difference in price. The defendant contended that though he
had ordered the merchandise no fixed price had been agreed upon,
and that he was not liable because there was no sale. The court
held: "It is immaterial that no price was agreed upon. When
goods are ordered from a merchant without any stipulation as to
price, he has a right to recover their market value. '42
This principle finds ample support in Article 1816 of the Civil
Code43 and it is clear that the liability of the "purchaser" in such
cases rests on a quasi contractual basis. The court relied for its de-
cision on the case of Helluin v. Minor in which this principle is an-
nounced by way of dictum. In that case, an assignment of a pre-
emption right to land was made to the defendant. The assignment
had been made in accordance with an act of Congress regulating
such transfers, and the instrument evidencing the transfer con-
tained the following:
"For value received, we ... assign, transfer and set over unto
Van Perkins Winder ... and Win. J. Minor... all of our right,
title, claim and demand, to a tract of land purchased by us...
situated in the district of lands subject to sale at New Orleans,
and request that a patent may be issued to the said Van Per-
kins Winder and Win. J. Minor .... "14
39. See authorities cited note 32, supra.
40. II. T. Cottam & Co. v. Moises, 149 La. 305, 88 So. 916 (1921); Union
Tank Car Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 178 La. 940, 152 So. 571 (1934).
See also Helluin v. Minor, 12 La. Ann. 124 (1857).
41. 149 La. 305, 88 So. 916 (1921).
42. 149 La. at 307, 88 So. at 917.
43. Art. 1816, La. Civil Code of 1870, states in part: "To receive goods from
a merchant without any express promise, and to use them, implies a contract
to pay the value."
44. Helluin v. Minor, 12 La. Ann. 124, 125-126 (1857).
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The plaintiff claimed that the title of the defendant assignee was
invalid because the act of transfer was void for want of a fixed
price. In the light of the foregoing, this contention was apparently
correct but the court made the following observation:
"There cannot be any doubt that our courts would con-
sider the instrument invalid as a donation, and it may not be
(technically considered) a sale under the Civil Code; but it
does not necessarily follow that the contract itself, after its
execution, is to be considered as void because it cannot be
classed under the contract of sale.'
"An illustration of this occurs where a planter or a head
of a family sends his servant for, or orders himself in person,
without agreeing upon the price, such articles of merchandise
at a store where he has credit as he may need. The dealer
charges the goods upon his books at such prices as he deems
just. Here no price is agreed upon, and at most it can only be
implied that the planter will pay a price equal to the value of
the goods at the end of the year or period of credit. Now, al-
though there has been no fixed price agreed upon, the planter,
after having consumed the goods or injured the same by wear,
would not be listened to for a moment in a court of justice,
with a plea that in the delivery to him of each article there
was no contract of sale, because there was no price agreed
upon as required by Article 2439 of the Civil Code. The court
would at once conclude that the property in the goods, by a
contract analogous to the contract of sale, had vested in one
party, and the value of the goods was due to the other party,
and that if the contract was not a sale, it was an innominal
contract, not the less obligatory." (Italics supplied.)"'
But this rule had no application whatever to the factual situation
presented in the case as it will appear from the court's further
statement:
"Now, as this instrument was made to conform to the in-
structions of the department at Washington, where it was to
produce its principal effect, we think we may safely infer from
the language used 'for value received,' that the price was
agreed upon and paid, or its equivalent given in exchange."
(Italics supplied.) 46
The case rests, therefore, not on the doctrine announced, but on
45. Ibid.
46. Id. at 126.
[Vol. IV.
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the conclusion that, since the contract was made in accordance
with instructions from Washington and since it was there that its
principal effects were to be had, the price should be presumed to
have been agreed upon and paid."'
Another illustration of an innominate contract is found in the
case of Union Tank Car Company v. Louisiana Oil Refining Cor-
poration.48 A lease provided that the lessee would have the right
to all the buildings erected on the premises and to remove them
at the expiration thereof. The lessee also had the right to abandon
the buildings in which event the lessor agreed to reimburse him
in "an amount equal to the value thereof, obsolescence and de-
preciation both considered." It was contended that this part of the
agreement was meant to be a sale and, as such, it was void for
want of a fixed price. The court held:
"But to this we cannot accede. Ordinarily it is true that
any transfer of property from one to another for a considera-
tion in money is a sale, because generally the parties have first
agreed on a fixed price. But there are many instances in which
the ownership of property passes from one to another for a
consideration payable in money but not fixed or agreed upon
by the parties beforehand."
"Hence our conclusion is that when the Code provides
that in a sale the price must be certain it speaks only of the
simple contract of sale and not of a transfer of property as a
mere incident to some other contract, as a lease. And in this
case it was a mere incident of the lease between the parties
that the lessor bound himself to reimburse the lessee at the
end of the lease for such buildings, trackage and machinery as
the lessee might elect not to take away."49
The mere fact, therefore, that a contract is not technically a
sale or an exchange or any other recognized contract, because of
the absence of some essential element, does not make it invalid;
such contract will be enforceable under the general rules of obli-
gations, if it is found that a valid agreement has been entered into
between the parties. The difference is that since the contract is
not a sale the peculiar principles of law governing sale are not
binding on the parties.
47. Cf. Kleinpeter v. Harrigan, 21 La. Ann. 196 (1869).
48. 178 La. 940, 152 So. 571 (1934).
49. 178 La. at 943, 945, 152 So. at 572, 573.
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B. CERTAINTY As TO PRICE
An important question is whether the price must be stated in
the contract with definite certainty. The provision as to certainty
contained in Article 2464 of the Civil Code means that the price
must be fixed and determined by the parties,5 ° but the codal pro-
visions do not require that the price be stated in the act at all. It
is sufficient for the validity of the transaction that the parties
have agreed to a fixed and determinate price.51 Thus in a sale "for
a valuable consideration" the contract is valid and binding if the
parties can show the true consideration for the transfer. 2 In the
majority of cases, however, such showing can only be made by
parol testimony and thus the problem as to when parol evidence
is admissible becomes one of primary importance.
Parol Evidence to Prove Real Price
Article 2276 of the Civil Code provides:
"Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against or be-
yond what is contained in the acts, nor on what may have been
said before, or at the time of making them, or since."
Article 1900 of the Civil Code provides:
"If the cause expressed in the consideration [contract]
should be one that does not exist, yet the contract can not be
invalidated, if the party can show the existence of a true and
sufficient consideration."5 8
Under this last article the courts have generally admitted
oral testimony to show actual consideration (1) when the instru-
ment evidencing the transaction is silent;5 4 (2) when the consid-
eration stated in the writing is insufficient in itself to support the
contract;5 5 (3) when the consideration stated is proved to be sim-
ulated, that is, when consideration other than that stated is the
true cause for the contract; 56 and (4) to show a consideration
which will support a contract other than a contract of sale.57
50, Art. 2464, La. Civil Code of 1870.
51, Walker v. Fort, 3 La. 535 (1832); Pulford v. Dimmick, 107 La. 403, 31
So. 879 (1902). See also Moore v. Pitre, 149 La. 910, 90 So. 252 (1921); Breeden
v. Breeden, 147 So. 757 (La. App. 1933).
52. Breeden v. Breeden, 147 So. 757 (La. App. 1933).
53. Arts. 1900, 2276, La. Civil Code of 1870.
54, Breeden v. Breeden, 147 So. 757 (La. App. 1933).
55. Moore v. Pitre, 149 La. 910, 90 So. 252 (1921); Simoneaux v. Lebermuth
& Israel Planting Co., Ltd., 155 La. 689, 99 So. 531 (1924).
56. Brown v. Brown, 30 La. Ann. 966 (1878); Jackson v. Miller, 32 La. Ann.
432 (1880); Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1882); Citizens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Willis, 183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935); Ryals v. Ryals, 199 So.
481 (La. App. 1940). Cf. Chaffe v. Scheen, 34 La. Ann. 684 (1882).
57, Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1882); Simoneaux v.
[Vol. IV
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Some of the decisions are to the effect that it is the necessary
consequence of Article 1900 that the true cause of a contract "may
be shown by legal evidence, oral or written, and that the evidence
adduced for that purpose can never be considered as contradicting
the act. '58 On the other hand, it has been stated with equal force
that the provisions of Article 1900 were never intended to "abro-
gate the rule by which parol evidence is inadmissible to contra-
dict or vary written acts."59 The broadness of these statements has
given rise to much confusion, with the result that the question as
to the proper limitation on the scope of Article 1900 has become a
matter of much difficulty.60
The French jurisprudence is based on general principles of
law similar to our own,6 1 and it admits parol testimony to show
Lebermuth & Israel Planting Co., Ltd., 155 La. 689, 99 So. 531 (1924). See also
Holmes v. Patterson, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 693 (La. 1818); D'Orgenoy v. Droz, 13 La.
382 (1839); Nofsinger v. Hinchee, 199 So. 597 (La. App. 1941). Cf. Loranger v.
Citizens' Nat. Bank, 162 La. 1054,. 111 So. 418 (1927); Whittington v. Heirs of
Pegues, 165 La. 151, 115 So. 441 (1928).
58. See Delabigarre v. Second Municipality of New Orleans, 3 La. Ann.
230, 235 (1848). See also Jackson v. Miller, 32 La. Ann. 432 (1880); Landry v.
Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1882).
59. Clark v. Hedden, 109 La. 147, 154, 33 So. 116, 119 (1902).
60. In numerous instances the decisions have distinguished the cases in
which parol evidence was admitted from those in which the evidence was held
inadmissible, but the bases for the distinction have not been made very clear.
See Robinson v. Britton, 137 La. 863, 69 So. 282 (1915); Loranger v. Citizens'
Nat. Bank, 162 La. 1054, 111 So. 418 (1927); Whittington v. Heirs of Pegues,
165 La. 151, 115 So. 441 (1928); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Willis, 183 La. 127,
162 So. 822 (1935); Barre v. Hunter, 181 So. 674 (La. App. 1938); Wainwright v.
Gilham, 188 So. 434 (La. App. 1939); Grimm v. Pugh, 197 So. 641 (La. App.
1940); Ryals v. Ryals, 199 So. 481 (La. App. 1940).
Perhaps the best reason for the admissibility of parol evidence under Ar-
ticle 1900 of the Civil Code is that given by Chief Justice O'Niell in Cleveland
v. Westmoreland, 191 La. 863, 873, 186 So. 593, 596 (1939), as follows:
"According to article 1900 of the Civil Code, if the cause of consideration
stated in the contract is not the true cause or consideration for which the
contract was made, the contract is yet valid 'if the party [against whom a
want of consideration is pleaded] can show the existence of a true and suffi-
cient consideration.'" (Italics supplied.)
In Chaffe v. Scheen, 34 La. Ann. 684 (1882), the court limited the operation
of Article 1900 to cases where the consideration sought to be introduced was
such as was contemplated by the parties at the time of execution of the act
but which was misdescribed therein.
61. Art. 2276, La. Civil Code of 1870, is based on the provisions of Art. 1341,
French Civil Code. Although Article 1900 of the Louisiana Civil Code has no
counterpart in the Code Napoleon, it is evident that it had its origin in well
recognized principles of French jurisprudence. Toullier states:
"Although an obligation can not exist without an honest and valid cause
it is not necessary, under penalty of nullity, that such cause be expressed. The
Roman laws ordained that failure to express a cause In a writing required
the person for whose benefit it had been made, to prove that there was a real
and legitimate cause.
"The opinions of the French authors were so divided on this point, that
the court did not always decide in the same manner. However, the jurispru-
dence seemed to adopt the opinion of those who thought that failure to ex-
press the cause did not render the obligation null . .
"This wise opinion was made into law by article 1132, which provides that
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the existence of consideration other than that expressed in the
written act only when the writing itself has been disproved by
competent evidence. In other words, the person attacking the con-
tract as invalid must show by competent evidence62 that there
was no consideration. Once the non-existence of the consideration
has been proved, the other party may then show the existence of
other legal and sufficient cause to uphold the contract."2
The party against whom want of consideration is pleaded,
although the writing does state the existence of the cause, has
thus two alternatives: (1) he may object to the evidence prof-
fered (unless it is otherwise competent) and thereby prevent
the contradiction of the writing, or (2) he may permit the evi-
dence to be introduced (if not otherwise legally admissible) and
then, admitting the non-existence or simulation of the considera-
tion, show by any other evidence the true consideration for the
contract. 4 I
In Louisiana no difficulty is presented when the contract of
sale is silent as to price or When the price therein stated is merely
nominal. It is generally admitted that in such cases parol evidence
is admissible to show the existence of serious price. 5 In the first
instance, the cause of the contract is presumed and the evidence
the obligation is none the less valid, although the cause has not been ex-
pressed.
"Since it is not necessary to express in the act the cause of the obligation,
it must be concluded that the obligation is valid although the cause expressed
is false, provided that there exists another legitimate cause. This is a point
decided in several cases by the court of cassation.
"But if it is proved that the cause expressed is false, the creditor must
then prove that the obligation has another honest and legitimate cause .... 
(Italics supplied.) 3 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais (derni6re ed. 1833) 381,
382, nos 175-177.
See also 12 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique
de Droit Civil, 1 Des Obligations (3 ed. 1906) 341, no 308, and authorities
therein cited.
62. "Competent evidence" is understood to be any evidence admissible
under the parol evidence rule, such as other written instruments, or even oral
evidence not objected to at the time. See Comment (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 427, 431.
63. Id. at 436.
64. When proof that the consideration stated in the writing did not actu-
ally exist, the defendant has the burden of proving the existence of another
cause, and this proof may be made by any type of evidence. Cass. 5 d6cembre
1900, Sirey 1901.1.229; 2 Planiol, Trait6 Elmentaire de Droit Civil (2 ed. 1926)
429, no 1206.
65. Klein v. Dinkgrave, 4 La. Ann. 540 (1849); Read v. Hewitt, 120 La. 288,
45 So. 143 (1907); Breeden v. Breeden, 147 So. 757 (La. App. 1933). This is in
accord with the French jurisprudence. See 4 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note
29, at 558, 559, § 345.
66. Art. 1894, La. Civil Code of 1870; Barrow v. Cazeaux, 5 La. 72 (1833);
Pack v. Chapman, 16 La. Ann. 366 (1861). See also 12 Baudry-Lacantinerie et
Barde, op. cit. supra note 61, at 368, no 318.
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is thus admissible merely to explain that which is already im-
plied, and not to vary or contradict the writing." Especially is this
so when the parties have taken the precaution to show that they
had in mind the payment of some price or consideration not ex-
pressed in the act, as for example when the sale is stated to be for
a "valuable consideration."68 In the second instance, the price be-
ing in itself insufficient to support the sale, it is regarded as a con-
tract without a stated price and the same rule is applied .6 With
greater force is this rule applicable when the sale is made for one
dollar and "other valuable consideration" in which case the addi-
tional consideration may be shown by parol.0
A more difficult problem is presented however when an at-
tempt is made to show that a consideration other than the one
stated is the true "price" for the contract. The decisions which
admit parol evidence as not violating Article 2276, are in apparent
conflict with perhaps a greater number of decisions in which
parol evidence to show true consideration, or consideration other
than that stated in the instrument, was inadmissible as violative
of the parol evidence rule.7 1
67. Klein v. Dinkgrave, 4 La. Ann. 540 (1849).
68. Breeden v. Breeden, 147 So. 757 (La. App. 1933).
69. "If the true and only consideration had been $1, the transaction would
have been, not a sale, but an attempted donation in disguise. Rev. Civ. Code,
art. 2464. As a donation, the transaction would be null .. .however, the law
declares that a contract may be valid although the cause or consideration for
making it be not expressed in the act; that what is meant by the cause or
consideration of a contract is the motive for making it; and that, if the
cause or consideration expressed in the act be not the true cause or consider-
ation for making the contract, it shall, nevertheless, be valid, if the party can
show that there was a true and sufficient consideration for the contract ...
The defendant in this case has proven that there was a sufficient considera-
tion to make the transaction valid as a contract of sale." Moore v. Pitre, 149
La. 910, 914, 90 So. 252, 254 (1921). See also Morris v. Monroe Sand & Gravel
Co., 166 La. 656, 117 So. 763 (1928).
70. Linkswiler v. Hoffman, 109 La. 948, 34 So. 34 (1903); Morris v. Monroe
Sand & Gravel Co., 166 La. 656, 117 So. 763 (1928); Breeden v. Breeden, 147
So. 757 (La. App. 1933). If the contract is silent as to price and no evidence
is adduced to show the agreement of the parties concerning it, the contract is
not enforceable as a sale. Conway v. Bordier, 6 La. 346 (1834); D'Orgenoy v.
Droz, 13 La. 382 (1839); Tiernan v. Martin, 2 Rob. 523 (La. 1842); Gorham v.
Hayden, 6 Rob. 450 (La. 1844); Wise v. Guthrie, 11 La. Ann. 91 (1856); Forbes
v. Burke, 24 La. Ann. 85 (1872); Landeche Bros. Co. v. New Orleans Coffee
Co., 173 La. 701, 138 So. 513 (1931). At common law, when the contract is silent
as to price, the contract is enforced at a reasonable price. Uniform Sales Act
§ 9(1), (4). This rule is made applicable to executed contracts as well as to
executory contracts although, at first, the courts expressed doubt as to the
applicability of the rule to cases when the contract had not been executed
on either side. Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376, 3 L.J.C.P. 98 (1834); Prosser,
Open Price in Contracts for the Sale of Goods (1932) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 733,
738-741.
71. Delabigarre v. Second Municipality of New Orleans, 3 La. Ann. 230
(1848); Brown v. Brown, 30 La. Ann. 966 (1878); Jackson v. Miller, 32"La. Ann.
432 (1880); Robinson v. Britton, 137 La. 863, 69 So. 282 (1915); Loranger v.
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An examination of the cases will show, however, that the dif-
ficulty has arisen from the manner in which the rules have been
stated rather than by inconsistent results. In Robinson v. Briton,2
the plaintiff brought suit to annul a purported sale of land for a
recited consideration of $100.00. He alleged that the true consider-
ation for the transfer was the defendant's promise to convey an-
other tract of land to the plaintiff, and that the defendant had
neither paid the money, as recited in the act, nor made the con-
veyance, as he had agreed. Evidence offered by the plaintiff to
sustain his allegations was excluded as violative of the parol evi-
dence rule, and judgment was given for the defendant.
In Barre v. Hunter,"' the plaintiff had sold to the defendant a
piece of property for a stated consideration of ninety dollars cash.
Subsequently plaintiff brought suit to annul the sale on the
grounds that the transfer had been made upon defendant's verbal
promise to support and maintain the plaintiff, and for this purpose
parol evidence was offered to prove his allegations. Here again
parol evidence was rejected under the provisions of Article 2276,
but the reasons for the ruling were not quite clear.7" Johnson v.
Johnson"7 was a case in which the plaintiff had sold a piece of
property for a recited cash consideration of five hundred dollars
and "other valuable considerations." Subsequently suit was
brought to annul the sale on the grounds, amongst others, that
there was no consideration for the sale. But the court held:
"We are also satisfied from the testamony that Mrs. Johnson
personally did not receive any consideration for the sale....
However, in the absence of any showing of fraud or error the
parol evidence introduced by the plaintiff and admitted upon
the allegations of fraud or error was not admissible to show
that the recited consideration of $500 was not received by the
plaintiff. . . .When plaintiff signed the instrument and ac-
Citizens' Nat. Bank, 162 La. 1054, 111 So. 418 (1927); Whittington v. Heirs of
Pegues, 165 La. 151, 115 So. 441 (1928); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Willis,
183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935); Barre v. Hunter, 181 So. 674 (La. App. 1938);
Johnson v. Johnson, 191 La. 408, 185 So. 299 (1938).
72. 137 La. 863, 69 So. 282 (1915).
73. 181 So. 674 (La. App. 1938).
74. "The cases relied upon by the plaintiff ... are inapposite. The theory,
under which the parol evidence was admitted in those matters, was that it
was not against or beyond what was contained in the acts as a contradiction
of the clear recitals but, on the contrary, to give effect to the contract arising
therefrom by supplementing necessary information which was omitted. In
other words, the testimony was received for the purpose of enhancing the
validity of the authentic act rather than for the purpose of destroying or
impairing its sanctity." Barre v. Hunter, 181 So. 674, 675 (La. App. 1938).
75. 191 La. 408, 185 So. 299 (1938).
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knowledged the receipt of $500 cash consideration for the sale,
she was bound by her written acknowledgment .... ,,'6
In Whittington v. Heirs of Pegues,77 the defendant's mother had
bought, during her marriage, a piece of property for a recited
price of one thousand dollars for which she gave her promissory
note. After the death of her husband she sold the land to the
plaintiff who brought a petitory action to be declared owner of
the entire tract. Defendants claimed ownership of one-half un-
divided interest on the grounds that when the property was pur-
chased by their mother it was community property, and that con-
sequently she could not have sold the entire tract. The plaintiff at-
tempted to show by parol that the original act of sale to defend-
ant's mother was in effect a donation, for no consideration was
actually paid; but the court held that he was bound by the act
and could not contradict the contents thereof by parol. In support
of this ruling, the court quoted with approval from Loranger v.
Citizens' National Bank of Hammond8 to the effect that parol
evidence was inadmissible for the purpose of contradicting the
contract in order to substitute in its place a contract of a dissim-
ilar nature.7 9
It may thus be observed that, in the cases where parol evi-
dence was rejected, the evidence was offered to attack the validity
of the contract in direct contradiction of the provisions of the
writing and was properly rejected under Article 2276 of the Civil
Code.
In those cases where parol evidence has been admitted under
Article 1900 to show the real consideration for the sale, the evi-
dence was offered by the person against whom want of considera-
tion had been pleaded, after having admitted the allegation that
the recited consideration was not the true cause for the contract.
In Brown v. Brown,8 0 the court stated: "The plaintiff's objection
that the defendant could not prove what was the real considera-
tion for the transfer.., is not well taken. C. C. 1900." (Italics sup-
plied.)
Again, in Jackson v. Miller,8' the sale was attacked as simu-
lated and fraudulent and void "for want of legal price and con-
76. Johnson v. Johnson, 191 La. 408, 416, 185 So. 299, 302 (1938). See also
Grimm v. Pugh, 197 So. 641 (La. App. 1940).
77. 165 La. 151, 115 So. 441 (1928).
78. 162 La. 1054, 111 So. 418 (1927).
79. See discussion on p. 388, infra.
80. 30 La. Ann. 966, 968 (1878).
81. 32 La. Ann. 432, 435 (1880).
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sideration." The defendant then offered evidence to prove that the
real consideration for the transfer was the delivery and cancella-
tion of plaintiff's unpaid mortgage notes held by the defendant.
The court said: "To say that this is to permit parol evidence to
contradict the written contract is an abuse of terms."
In Landry v. Landry, 2 an action was brought to annul a sale
of land on the grounds that the sale was simulated as the recited
consideration of $3,500.00 was never paid. The defendant admit-
ted non-payment of the price, but sought to prove by parol the
true consideration for the transfer. The court permitted the evi-
dence saying:
"The construction which this article (1900) has uniformly re-
ceived at the hands of this Court clearly authorized the admis-
sion of parol evidence to prove that by the stipulation of a
price, paid cash in the sum of $3500, the parties understood
what was to them equivalent thereto....,,
In Citizens Bank & Trust Company v. Willis,8 4 plaintiff again
sought to set aside a sale from mother to son on the grounds that
the recited price of $3,000.00 cash was not actually paid. The de-
fendant's parol evidence to prove the real consideration was
sought to be excluded on the grounds that it contradicted the
terms of the writing. The court held the parol evidence rule in-
applicable and allowed the proof to be made. In Ryals v. Ryals,8
presenting the same facts as the Landry case, the court of appeal
reached a similar result by permitting evidence as to the true
nature of the consideration.
The cases may thus be divided into two groups: (1) those in
which a direct attack is made by parol, and (2) those in which
after the attack has been made, other evidence to show the valid-
ity of the contract has been admitted. The parties to the contract
cannot contradict the written instrument by parol evidence by
showing that no price was actually paid or that some other con-
sideration was the cause of the contract. But should such proof be
made by one of the parties, by other written evidence or even
by parol evidence not objected to, the other party may avail him-
self of Article 1900 and show the actual consideration for the con-
tract or the true character of the consideration given. In other
words, it is only the party against whom a want of consideration
82. 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888).
83. Landry v. Landry, 40 La. Ann. 229, 231, 3 So. 728, 729 (1888).
84. 183 La. 127, 162 So. 822 (1935).
85. 199 So. 841 (La. App. 1940).
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is proved who can take advantage of the provisions of Article 1900.
Thus, the jurisprudence of Louisiana on this point is really not
conflicting and, furthermore, it is in accord with the rules applica-
ble in France as heretofore shown . 6
At this point, it is important to note that where parol evi-
dence is admissible to show the actual consideration for the trans-
action, the nature of the contract may thereby be changed, as pre-
viously discussed; and though the courts have not generally dis-
tinguished the contracts involved, they have in some instances
clarified the situation. In Landry v. Landry,8 7 a sale was held to be
in reality an onerous donation since the actual consideration for
the transfer was the obligation undertaken by the "vendee" to
provide for the maintenance and support of the "vendors" during
the balance of their lives. Similarly, in Simoneaux v. Lebermouth
and Israel Planting Company,"8 where the consideration support-
ing a transfer of a right of way was not a price in money, the
court held:
"The act technically speaking, is not a sale, for the real con-
sideration is not a price in current money.... But is rather the
exchange of the right of way for the benefits to be derived
from the construction of the road, and as such, it is perfectly
valid." 9
In Nofsinger v. Hincheseo the court of appeal held that al-
though the consideration proved by the defendants could not sup-
port a contract of sale because it was not a price in money, yet
the transfer could stand as a valid donation.
In the case of Loranger v. Citizens' Bank of Hammond"' a re-
sult apparently opposite to that arrived at in the Landry case was
reached. The defendant, as judgment creditor of the plaintiff's
husband, seized and advertised for sale a parcel of ground in ex-
ecution of his judgment. The plaintiff, wife of the judgment
debtor, sought to enjoin the sale claiming ownership of the land
in question by virtue of a previous transfer to her from her hus-
band. Since the transfer was in the form of a sale, and null on its
86. For a general discussion as to the admissibility of parol evidence under
Art. 1900, La. Civil Code of 1870, see Comment (1941) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
427. For other cases on the same problem, see also cases cited under note 90,
infra.
87. 40 La. Ann. 229, 3 So. 728 (1888).
88. 155 La. 689, 99 So. 531 (1924).
89. Simoneaux v. Lebermuth & Israel Planting Co., 155 La. 689, 693, 99
So. 531, 532 (1924).
90. 199 So. 597 (La. App. 1941).
91. 162 La. 1054, 111 So. 418 (1927).
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face because not coming within the provisions of Article 2446 of
the Civil Code, the defendant rightfully contended that the title
to the property remained in the husband, and thus subject to
seizure.2 The plaintiff sought to prove, however, by parol evi-
dence, that the intention of the parties was to make a donation
inter vivos and not a sale. To this evidence the defendant objected
on the grounds that it was an attempt to vary the written instru-
ment. The court sustained the objection saying:
"But to resort to such evidence for the purpose of contradict-
ing or varying the contract entered into, in order to substitute
in its place a contract of a dissimilar nature, is plainly repro-
bated by the textual provisions of our Code."93
It is submitted that the rule, as thus announced, is unsound.
The reason why the evidence should have been held inadmissi-
ble was that the plaintiff, who sought to introduce it, was not the
proper party to take advantage of Article 1900. He was not the
party against whom the want of consideration was pleaded or
proved. To say that parol evidence cannot be admitted to prove a
contract different from that ostensibly contemplated by the par-
ties is to beg the question since whenever parol evidence is ad-
missible under Article 1900 a contract different from that ex-
pressed in the instrument is often the result. This follows from
the fact, already discussed, that it is the consideration which de-
termines the nature of the contract.
Determination of Price by Parties or by Third Persons
Article 2464 of the Civil Code requires that the price must be
fixed and determined by the parties, but Article 2465 provides
that it "may be left to the arbitration of a third person."
Several questions may arise from the provisions of these two
articles: (1) Is Article 2465 an exception to the rule of Article
2464? (2) Must the parties name the appraisers or experts at the
time of making the agreement? (3) May they agree that the price
should be fixed by third persons to be subsequently appointed by
them, and if so, what is the effect of such contracts and the liabil-
ity of the parties under them?
92. " ... the putative sale from husband to wife, purporting to have been
made for money in hand paid, is not valid upon its face, but is distinctly
invalid, as being apparently in violation of a prohibitory law. It cannot,
therefore, be said to evidence a real transaction, but leaves the title to the
property, apparently, in the vendor, and subject to seizure at the suit of his
creditor." Rush v. Landers, 107 La. 549, 560, 32 So. 95, 100 (1902).
93. Loranger v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 162 La. 1054, 1059, 111 So. 418, 420
(1927).
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At first blush, it would seem that Article 2465 makes an ex-
ception to Article 2464, but upon closer examination it is clear
that it is only the parties themselves who may fix the price for
they alone are the parties to the contract. It cannot be logically
contended that a stranger to the contract could dictate a price
which would be binding on the parties unless they had so agreed,
that is, unless they had appointed him for the purpose of fixing
the price. The third party is thus the mandatary of the parties,
and as such, his act in fixing the price is the act of the parties
themselvesY 4 This is important because it serves as the basis for
determining whether the parties to the contract shall be bound
by the estimation made by the experts. Having delegated to a
third person authority to fix the price, the parties should be
bound by his act under ordinary principles of mandate, and the
price thus fixed should be binding on them 5
Ordinarily the stipulation leaving the price to the arbitration
of a third person also names the person or persons charged with
that duty, and in such a case the parties are bound by the contract
for whatever price the appraisers shall fix. However, the ap-
praisers may not be able or may even refuse to fix the price, in
which event Article 2465 provides that there is no sale. Thus the
sale is subordinated to the condition, suspensive in character, that
the price shall be fixed and as long as the price remains undeter-
mined the sale remains inoperative. 96 Once the price is determined
94. This is the position taken by the French authorities. 5 Aubry et Rau,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 16, § 349; 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit.
supra note 16, at 113, no 134; 16 Duranton, op. cit. supra note 30, at 150, no 116;
24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 29, at 85 et seq., no 77; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op.
cit. supra note 16, at 31, no 37.
95. There is some disagreement between the commentators as to whether
or not the price as fixed by the person appointed is irrevocably binding upon
the parties. It is generally agreed that the price is not binding if there has
been fraud or collusion; but as to whether simple error on the part of the
"expert" or the fixing of an inequitable price will relieve the parties, the
commentators are divided. See 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 29, at 16,
§ 349; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 16, at 32, no 38.
The writer takes the position that since the appraisers are considered as
the mandataries of the parties, the latter should be relieved only for causes
which would ordinarily relieve the principal from the consequences of the
acts of his mandatary. See 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 141, no 140(2).
In Krauss v. Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 15 N.E.(2d) 207, 117 A.L.R. 1355
(1938), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the parties are bound
by the price fixed by the third person even if that person is an interested
party provided no fraud or bad faith is shown.
96. Art. 2471, La. Civil Code of 1870; Tiernan v. Martin, 2 Rob. 523 (La.
1842); Fort v. Union Bank of Louisiana, 11 La. Ann. 708 (1856); Frank I. Ab-
bott Lumber Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 140 La. 130, 72 So. 841 (1916) (re-
versed on other grounds). See also Louis Werner Sawmill Co. v. O'Shee, 111
La. 817, 35 So. 919 (1904). To the same effect see 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra
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the sale is binding on the parties and it will have a retroactive
effect to the date of contracting. 7
Should the appraisers be unable to agree or unwilling to fix
the price, the court does not have the power to intervene either
by appointing other appraisers or by fixing the price itself. The
French commentators on the Code Napoleon point out that if the
court were permitted to fix the price whenever the mandataries of
the parties refused or disagreed, the last clause of Article 159211
would be rendered inoperative since it provides that in such a
case there is no sale. Furthermore, were the price to be fixed by
another not designated by the parties, there would be lacking the
element of consent because the parties have bound themselves
only for the price which the designated persons should fix. Unless,
therefore, they have agreed to the intervention of the court in
case of disagreement, the latter has no authority to make their
contract for them."' This result has been adopted in Louisiana.'
A different situation occurs when the parties have not by
their agreement designated the persons charged with fixing the
price, that is, when the parties have simply agreed to a price to
be fixed by experts to be designated later.
In Louis Werner Sawmill Company v. O'Shee'0° it was held
that such a contract was null and of no effect, and a number of
French authorities were cited in support of the decision. There
was an agreement to sell certain land at a price to be estimated by
two experts to be thereafter chosen by the parties. The estimators
were appointed but they could not agree as to the price. In a suit
for specific performance the court sustained an exception of no
cause of action, stating:
"The case being one, then, where the parties have agreed that
the amount of the price should be determined and fixed by the
note 29, at 17, § 349; 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16,
at 134, no 135; 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 29, at 81, no 74.
The same result is obtained at common law under Section 10 of the Eng-
lish Sale of Goods Act and Section 10 of the Uniform Sales Act. Prosser, op.
cit. supra note 100, at 781.
97. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra. note 29, at 17, n. 32, § 349; 19 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16, at 134, no 135; 24 Laurent, op.
cit. supra note 29, at 81, no 74; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 16, at
32, no 38. Cf. Arts. 2041, 2043, 2471, La. Civil Code of 1870.
98. Art. 1592, French Civil Code [Art. 2465, La. Civil Code of 1870].
99. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 29, at 16, n. 29, § 349; 19 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16, at 138, no 139; 24 Laurent, op.
cit. supra note 29, at 82, no 75.
100. Louis Werner Sawmill Co. v. O'Shee, 111 La. 817, 35 So. 919 (1904).
At common law, similar results are had. Prosser, A Handbook of the Law of
Torts (1941) 781-783.
101. 111 La. 817, 35 So. 919 (1904).
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agency of estimators or experts to be thereafter named by
themselves, the question is whether such a contract is valid as
a sale....
"With the exception of Duvergier (Vol. 1, no. 155) and one
or two of the less authoritative writers, the French commenta-
tors on the Code Napoleon (article 1592, the exact counterpart
of our article 2465) seem to agree that, if the price is left to be
determined and fixed by experts to be named by the parties,
the contract is null, since either of the parties has it in his
power to nullify it by refusing to appoint the experts....
"And to the same effect are the decisions of the courts.
See,... Tissier, Journal du Palais, 1894, part. 2, p. 144, and the
footnote, where it is said: 'It is now generally admitted that a
sale made in consideration of a price to be determined by ex-
perts to be thereafter appointed has no binding character.' ))1o2
(Italics supplied.)
In the case of Andrus v. Eunice Bank Mill Company"'0 the
plaintiff sold to the defendant all the merchantable timber located
on his land at a certain price per thousand feet of timber. The
contract provided that (1) the defendant should have eighteen
months within which to cut and remove the timber, and (2) if at
the expiration of the eighteen months.there remained any timber
on the land the same was to be sold on a stumpage basis, the
quantity to be determined by an estimate made by two experts to
be appointed by the parties. The first part of the contract was per-
formed, but that part of the contract relating to the timber re-
maining after the eighteen month period was not performed. A
suit for specific performance of this part of the contract was main-
tained because, at the expiration of the eighteen months, there
remained a definite quantity of timber for which the defendant
was bound to pay the agreed price of so much per stump. The
court distinguished the Werner case on the grounds that there the
contract was never completed, whereas in the Andrus case, the
stipulation as to the estimate to be made by the experts was an
accidental stipulation to a completed contract of sale.
Justice Odom, in his dissenting opinion, considered that the
contract was severable. Part of the contract contemplated the sale
of timber to be cut and removed within eighteen months, and part
of it contemplated the sale of timber remaining after the eighteen
102. Louis Werner Sawmill Co. v. O'Shee, 111 La. 817, 820, 35 So. 919, 920
(1904).
103. 185 La. 403, 169 So. 449 (1936).
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month period, the price for the latter to be determined by an esti-
mate to be made by experts. True it was that the price was agreed
upon beforehand at so much per stump, but until the number of
stumps was ascertained the price was not determined, and could
not be determined until the experts had agreed on the quantity of
timber. Taking this view of the case, it was clear that the matter
came within the rule announced in the Werner case, and conse-
quently the contract should have been held unenforceable.,0 4
Although the decision of the majority on this point may be
questionable, it is submitted that the result reached was correct.
Admitting that the contract was severable and remained inchoate
as to the second part until the price had been ascertained, the
plaintiff nevertheless alleged in his petition that a "certain and
definite quantity of timber remained standing on [his] land"'10 5
and his allegation was necessarily admitted by the defendant for
the purposes of the trial of his exception of no cause of action.
Having thus admitted that there was a definite number of stumps
left for which he had obligated himself to pay a definite price per
stump, the defendant precluded himself from invoking the rule of
the Werner case.
In any event, even if the defendant had been permitted to
rely on the rule announced in the Werner case, he would have
been in no better position since, when properly analyzed, that
decision does not support his position. Although the court uses
very strong language to indicate that the contract of sale is null
and has no binding force where the price is to be ascertained by
experts to be appointed thereafter, this statement is not exactly
true and the French authors cited as authority therefor do not
support it. As a matter of fact, the great weight of authority in
France maintains that the parties may stipulate that the price
shall be fixed by experts to be thereafter appointed by them. It is
true that one of the parties may refuse to comply with his obliga-
tion of appointing the estimator and thus has it within his power
to nullify the agreement; but the contract is nonetheless binding,
even though it cannot be effective as a sale until and unless the
parties have named the arbitrators and they have fixed the price.
That the contract is ineffective if the parties only agree to desig-
nate the experts afterwards, is true only to the extent that there
104. Though it does not appear whether the experts were ever appointed
or whether if appointed, they failed to agree, it is presumed that the estimate
of the number of stumps remaining had not been made.
105. Andrus v. Eunice Band Mill Co., 185 La. 403, 411, 169 So. 449, 452
(1936).
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is no sale. However, the contract is binding upon the parties to the
extent that should either one refuse to comply with his obligation
to appoint the appraiser, which is an obligation to do, he will sub-
ject himself to damages for the breach thereof.1 06
The rule announced in the Werner case should therefore be
qualified by the foregoing. What was evidently intended was that
the sale was unenforceable as such, but that the obligation to
name the experts was nevertheless binding. This is shown not
only by the fact that the right was reserved to the plaintiff to sue
for damages (presumably for breach of contract), but also by the
fact that the court expressed its intention to follow the majority
of the French commentators, and not the views expressed by the
"less authoritative writers" who sustained that the contract is
void in its entirety as depending upon a purely potestative condi-
tion, and as producing no judicial effect."7
In this connection it is well to point out that although the
court reserved to the plaintiff the right to recover damages, none
would be forthcoming since the defendant had complied with all
of his obligations. He had appointed the appraisers; and the fact
that no agreement could be reached between the parties was due
to the inability of the experts to reach a decision, and not to a
refusal to comply with his obligation.
106. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16, at 136, no
138; 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Pr6cis de Droit Civil (13 ed. 1925) 340, no 748; 16
Duranton, op. cit. supra note 30, at 141-149, nos 108-114; 24 Laurent, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 83-85, no 76; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 16, at 33,
no 39. Cf. 6 Marcadd, op. cit. supra note 30, at 185.
A contrary view is expressed by Troplong as follows: "In effect, if the
expert is not designated in the contract, it depends upon the will of the
parties to prevent the fixing of the price and to render the sale null. It is a
potestative condition on the part of either party .. " 5 Troplong, op. cit.
supra note 32, at 205, no 157. A similar statement is made by Huc in the fol-
lowing language: "The parties may reserve to themselves the faculty to
designate the experts later. . . . If one of the parties refuses to concur on
this designation, the contract must be regarded as non-existent, and cannot
produce any judicial effect. Consequently the party who would take advantage
of the sale, cannot be permitted to recover damages for the refusal of the
other party to comply .. " 10 Huc, op. cit. supra note 29, at 59, no 36.
At common law, the contract is regarded as inchoate until the price is
determined, but failure to appoint the appraisers results in damages. This
follows from the provisions of Section 10 of the Uniform Sales Act providing
as follows:
"Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods at a price or on terms
to be fixed by a third person, and such third person without fault of the seller
or the buyer, cannot or does not fix the price . . . the contract . . . is thereby
avoided . . . Where such third person is prevented from fixing the price or
terms by fault of the seller or the buyer, the party not in fault may have
such remedies against the party in fault as are allowed by parts IV and V
of this act."
To the same effect, see Prosser, op. cit. supra note 100, at 783.
107. Ibid.
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From the foregoing, it is evident that in cases wherein the ex-
perts are to be subsequently appointed by the parties, damages
will be recoverable only when one of the parties is at fault in fail-
ing to cooperate in the appointment. If the obligation to do is
breached by fortuitous circumstances or by any other event not
within the power of the parties to prevent, no damages should be
allowed. 0 8
The effective date of the contract when the parties have
agreed to designate the estimators at some future time is different
from that of the contract in which the estimators are named in
the act itself. In the latter case, the contract is effective as of the
date of contracting.0 9 Not so in the former, because the parties
have done nothing with regard to the price; they have neither
fixed it, nor have they given their mandate to do so. The sale will
only be binding upon them when they have complied with their
agreement to name the estimators, and then only subject to the
suspensive condition that the experts name the price. Thus, as
soon as the condition is fulfilled, the contract will come into exist-
ence but will be effective only from the date on which it became
binding on the parties; that is, from the date of the appointment
of the experts. 10
Determination of Price by Other Methods
Under Article 2464 of the Civil Code, the parties are required
to fix the price for the sale. For obvious reasons,'11 however, they
may not be willing to agree on a fixed price, and consequently
several devices have been adopted by merchants with the view to
leaving the price more or less "open," to be ascertained by mar-
keting or other conditions. There is nothing illegal or contrary to
108. Tiernan v. Martin, 2 Rob. 523 (La. 1842); Fort v. Union Bank of Lou-
isiana, 11 La. Ann. 708 (1856): "He can only obtain damages against the re-
calcitrant at fault who fails to execute his obligation to do, which he has con-
tracted in the beginning." 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 16, at 33,
34, no 39. See also Frank I. Abbott Lumber Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 140
La. 130, 72 So. 841 (1916) (reversed on other grounds). See also Uniform Sales
Act, § 10, supra note 106.
109. "Although the price has not been, in principle, determined in an
absolute manner, nevertheless, it no longer depends upon the will of the
parties, and must, for this reason, be regarded as sufficiently determined for
the formation of the obligation. The estimation, once made, retroacts to the
date of the contract." 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 39, at 17, n. 32, §
349. To the same effect see authorities cited supra notes 96, 97.
110. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16, at 136, no
138 (10).
111. One of the important functions of the price in a contract of sale,
particularly in the sale of goods or merchandise, is to shift, as between the
parties, the risks of price fluctuations in the market. Llewellyn, loc. cit. supra
note 14.
[Vol. IV
1942] PROBLEMS REGARDING PRICE
public policy in such agreements.112 One possible objection that
may be made, however, is with regard to the price, since the va-
lidity of such agreements as sales depends upon whether the price
stated has been fixed with sufficient certainty.
According to the French authorities, the certainty of price is
satisfied when it has been sufficiently designated by the parties so
that, even though the exact amount thereof be unknown at the
time of contracting, it may yet be ascertained from other factors,
provided that it is not within the power of the parties to diminish
it or to augment it at will.1 ' Thus, there is uncertainty as to price
and consequently no sale when the buyer is to pay what he wishes
or what the seller requires. 14
Price to Be Fixed Later. When the parties agree that the price
will be fixed by them at some future date, the contract is invalid
as a sale because it lacks one of the essential elements of the con-
tract; and it would not become binding until the parties had come
to a definite agreement as to the price. Such an agreement, says
Professor Williston, "amounts to nothing more than a promise by
112. In Baucum and Kimball v. Garrett Mercantile Co., 188 La. 728, 178
So. 256 (1937), the Supreme Court of Louisiana said:
"But a contract of sale is not illegal where it provides for the fixing of the
price to be paid according to the value, or the future market price, of the
property sold....
"In the case at bar, the defendants entered into a contract for the sale of
their cotton to the plaintiff, which provided for the immediate delivery of the
cotton and for the fixing of the price therefor in accordance with the market
value of the cotton on the New York Cotton Exchange as of the future date
and that an advance be made to them by the purchaser, using as a basis
therefor the quotation for cotton of similar grade on the New York Cotton
Exchange as of the future date agreed upon, less a broker's commission and
a margin for the purchaser's protection. In our opinion, such a contract does
not entail any of the elements of a bet or wager, nor anything won or lost
at gaming. The fact that, upon the conclusion of such a sale, the market value
of the cotton might be higher or lower than was the advance quotation as of
the date on which the contract was entered into, does not of itself constitute
gaming or betting within the meaning and contemplation of Articles 2983
and 2984 of the Revised Civil Code any more than if the defendants had held
their cotton and borrowed money thereon in anticipation of a rising market."
113. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 29, at 17, 18, § 349; 19 Baudry-
Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16, at 131, 132, nos 132, 133; 16
Duranton, op. cit. supra note 30, at 139, 140, no 106; 24 Laurent, op. cit..supra
note 29, at 80, no 73; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 16, at 30, no 36;
5 Troplong, op. cit. supra note 32, at 202, no 151.
114. "Article 1591 requires that the price be determined by the parties..
It is elementary that there is no price if the vendor leaves it to the discretion
of the buyer, or if the buyer declares that he will pay what the vendor will
require. . .".. 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 32, at 202, no 151. See note 125,
infra.
The same rule obtaining in France obtains in Spain by virtue of the pro-
visions of Articles 1447, 1448,, 1449 of the Spanish Civil Code, and particularly
the provision of the latter article which provides that the determination of
the price may never be left to the judgment of one of the contracting parties.
See also 10 Manresa, op. cit. supra note 36, at 44-47.
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the buyer to pay such price as he chooses, for he need agree to
nothing which he does not choose"115 and consequently, the con-
tract would be invalid for the further reason that the determina-
tion of the price is left to the discretion of one of the contracting
parties.11
Alternative Prices. The contract may sometimes state an al-
ternative price. Although it may be argued that in such cases the
contract should be enforced at the-price most favorable to the
seller,' 17 it is submitted that because of the strict requirement as
to certainty of price the contract should fail.
Price Depending on the Market. The price may be made to
depend, however, upon the state of the market at a certain time
and place. In such cases the French authorities say that the price
is certain even though the amount thereof be unknown to tht-
parties at the time of contracting. In cases where this is done, it is
not within the power of either of the parties to diminish or to aug-
ment the price at will; but it depends upon a contingency beyond
the control of either party.'18 For the same reason, a sale price
based on retail prices would also satisfy the requirement of cer-
tainty.
Maximum and Minimum Prices. Sometimes the price is made
to depend on maximum and minimum prices. Typical contracts of
this kind are the sales of commodities on the stock exchanges in
which it is generally agreed that the buyer is to pay the market
price as of a particular day, not less than a stipulated minimum.
Here again the difficulty is one of determining whether the price
has been fixed with sufficient certainty. A logical interpretation of
such a contract is that the purchaser is to pay the market price as
of the date stipulated, but that should this price be less than the
minimum, he will pay the minimum stipulated. It must be noted
that this is not the same as agreeing to pay an alternative price
because here it is not within the control of either of the parties to
115. 1 Williston, Sales (2 ed. 1924) 311, § 167.
116' See authorities cited in note 114, supra. The same result is reached
at common law although it has been suggested that in such cases the con-
tract should be enforced at a reasonable price. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 100,
at 743-749.
117. Arts. 1957, 1958, 2472, La. Civil Code of 1870. See Prosser, op. cit. supra
note 100, at 749.
118. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 29, at 17, 18, § 349; 16 Duranton,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 139, 140, no 106; 10 Huc, op. cit. supra note 29, at 57,
58, no 36; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 16, at 30, no 36. Planiol et
Ripert state here that it suffices that the price be capable of determination by
one or a series of simple arithmetical operations.
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decrease or augment the price, but such determination depends
upon the market conditions.
In Louisiana, this same result would follow, as is clearly seen
from the case of Landeche Brothers Company v. New Orleans
Coffee Company.1 " In that case, syrup was sold at a certain price
per gallon if sugar sold at designated price per pound. The market
price of sugar at no time during the season reached the lowest
price named in the contract and the court therefore concluded
that there was no sale because the parties did not intend to bind
themselves except on condition that sugar sold at the price named
in the contract. It is further intimated that the contract would
have been enforceable had there been an agreement as to price in
the event the commodity sold for less than the price stated in the
contract.
120
Competitive Prices. Agreements to meet prices of competitors
are likewise valid in France, the theory being that the price is so
far determined that neither of the parties has it in his power to
change it at will. Thus, Duranton states:
"But the price is none the less certain from the beginning, al-
though the amount thereof be not known to the parties at the
time of the contract, when it is not within the power of one of
them to augment it or diminish it. It is sufficient that it be
ascertainable by relation to certain circumstances .... Such is
... the case where small vineyard proprietors or cultivators
sell their wine after, or even before, the harvest, at the price at
which another who has a well stocked cellar will sell his... .,1
On the other hand, there is disagreement among the French
authorities as to whether a sale at a price which might be offered
to the seller is valid. One line of authorities supports the view that
such a contract does not constitute a sale but rather an agreement
on the part of the vendor to give preference to a particular per-
son, if he should conclude to sell at all.122 Furthermore, Pothier
points out that it would be against public policy to enforce such
119. 173 La. 701, 138 So. 513 (1931).
120. "Plaintiff's counsel . . . contend that the contract itself shows that
this was an unconditional sale . . .but if it be conceded that counsel's con-
tention is correct, their client is in no better plight, for the reason that there
was no agreement as to the price of the commodity if sugar sold for less than
15 cents .. " Landeche Bros. Co. v. New Orleans Coffee Co., 173 La. 701, 706,
138 So. 513, 515 (1931). For the treatment that such contracts have received at
common law, see Prosser, op. cit. supra note 100, at 774-781.
121. 16 Duranton, op. cit. supra note 30, at 139, 140, no 106. To the same
effect see 1 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 36, at 130, no 109, and authorities
cited supra note 113.
122. 1 Pothier, Treatises on Contracts (Cushing's Transl. 1839) 16, no 27.
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contracts since they would give rise to much fraud, for the "buyer,
in order to obtain the thing for a small sum, might bring forward
a person to offer a mean price; and the seller, with a view to ob-
tain a large sum, might interpose an offer of a high price .... "I
Guillouard, on the other hand, states that this interpretation
is entirely contrary to the will of the parties. It is not their inten-
tion that the seller should sell the thing when and if he decides to
do so and to give the preference to the purchaser; there is, rather,
a real and actual agreement whereby the vendor is obliged to sell
the thing, if and when a fair offer is made to the vendor and the
purchaser is bound to buy it at the price so offered. According to
this interpretation the transaction is considered a sale under a
suspensive condition.124
It is clear that under any interpretation the price is uncertain
for it depends upon the will of the vendor. In other words, the
vendor is the sole master of the situation, and the final determina-
tion of the price depends upon what he considers fair. The con-
tract therefore should be void for uncertainty.1 25
Louisiana Law
The Louisiana courts have not announced any definite rule
for our guidance to determine when the price is or is not certain.
From an examination of the jurisprudence, however, it might be
shown that the adoption of the French test will not be in contra-
vention of the principles established by the code or those an-
nounced by the courts.
The supreme court has consistently held that the price is un-
certain when it is clear that the parties have not given their
consent to be bound by a specific amount. For example, when the
123. Ibid. To the same effect see also 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note
29, at 18, § 349; 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16, at
132, no 132; 5 Troplong, op. cit. supra note 32, at 203, no 153.
124. 1 Guillouard, op. cit. supra note 36, at 130-132, no 111; 10 Huc, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 58, no 36.
125. According to Planiol and Ripert, when the buyer has left the deter-
mination of the price to the vendor, the contract may be enforced as an
agreement on the part of the buyer to accept the price fixed by the seller,
but in such cases, the sale will not be concluded until this has been done.
10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 16, at 30, no 36. In support of this
statement the case of Duhamel v. Delpierre-Gournay, Douai, 15 mars 1886,
D.88.2.37 is cited. The case does not support the statement. In that case the
court held that in a sale of goods with the stipulation that the price should
be fixed by the vendor, the buyer cannot demand the nullity of the sale once
he has accepted delivery of the merchandise for then it no longer depends
upon any one of the parties to modify the contract.
In other words, liability for the price is predicated not on the contract
but upon quasi contractual principles as heretofore explained.
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parties have contracted to sell for "a good and valuable considera-
tion"'12 or when the price agreed upon has not been unequivocally
stated, as for example when the sale has been made "for about"
so much, not specifying a definite sum. 1'2 7 The price is also said to
be uncertain when it is to be paid in installments bearing interest
the amount of which has not been stated because, in such cases,
the interest is considered as part of the purchase price.121
It is readily observed, in the above instances, that the price
has not been sufficiently designated by the parties. In every one of
the given situations, no agreement has been reached concerning
the price, and it is within their power to augment or diminish it.
This may well be given as the reason why the price is said to be
uncertain.
Will the price be certain within the meaning of Article 2464
126. Conway v. Bordier, 6 La. 346 (1834); Gorham v. Hayden, 6 Rob. 450
(La. 1844); Wise v. Guthrie, 11 La. Ann. 91 (1856); Aguader v. Quish, 21 La.
Ann. 322 (1869).
127. Forbes v. Burke, 24 La. Ann. 85 (1872); Wright and Anderson v. An-
thon, 17 La. App. 633, 136 So. 753 (1931).
128. Kaplan v. Whitworth, 116 La. 337, 40 So. 723 (1906). In that case there
was a purported sale of land for a stated consideration of $500 cash and the
rest represented by several notes aggregating $7,000 making a total consider-
ation for the sale of the land "seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500)
and interest." It was held that "if the parties agree that they shall make a
sale, or a promise of sale, in the future, but fail to agree .. .as to the price
at which the sale is to be made, they evidently fail to make any agreement
at all. And it is equally plain that, if the rate of the interest which the de-
ferred part of the price is to bear is not fixed, the price is not fixed; this
interest being a component part of the price .... " (116 La. at 346, 40 So. at
726.)
The argument may be advanced, however, that the price was fixed at
$7,500 and that each note carried interest only from the date of maturity
(though this does not appear) and as such it was a penalty for the non-pay-
ment of money, in which case, it does not form part of the price. See Den-
dinger Inc. v. Emuy & Eichorn & Globe Indemnity Co., 12 La. App. 39 (1929).
In the case of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. McCall Bros. Planting &
Mfg. Co., 140 La. 763, 73 So. 857 (1917), it was held that attorneys' fees to be
paid in the event suit is brought to recover the price of sale form part of
the price and carries a vendor's privilege on the thing sold. On the other
hand, in the following contract "7 per cent discount if paid within 10 days
from delivery date. If not paid by the last of the month following 10 per cent
will be added to the above price" it was held that the 10 per cent increase in
the price was not part of the price, but was a penalty for failure to pay by
the last of the month and in that sense came within the definition of "inter-
est" as damages due for the delay in the performance of an obligation to pay
money. Dendinger Inc. v. Emuy & Eichorn & Globe Indemnity Co., 12 La.
App. 39 (1929).
Some French commentators are of the opinion that the price is suffi-
ciently certain when it has been fixed and agreed upon, although it is to be
augmented by a sum which is uncertain, as for example, a sale for $500 and
whatever else the vendee wishes to pay. 16 Duranton, op. cit. supra note 30,
at 140, no 107. 5 Troplong, op. cit. supra note 32, at 202, no 151. Accordingly, it
should follow that a sale of a stated sum and interest is not void for uncer-
tainty as to price.
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if, though not known at the time of contracting, it may never-
theless be ascertained later from other circumstances?
In Clark v. Comford129 there was an agreement to sell a tract
of land at two dollars per acre, but the number of acres in the
tract was unknown. Holding that the contract was unenforceable
for uncertainty as to price, the court said:
"While $2.00 per acre was agreed upon to be paid, yet the num-
ber of acres which were to be the object of the purchase was
uncertain, only ascertainable upon some fact to be afterwards
established .... The "thing sold" being uncertain, the price of
the same, being predicated upon the number of acres in the
tract, necessarily became also uncertain. ' '13°
In Gallaspy v. A. J. Ingersoll & Company"' the parties had
entered into two contracts for the sale of one hundred bales of
cotton "to weigh about 25,500 pounds" at so much per pound. The
court found the contracts certain as to object"'2 and therefore cer-
tain as to price, because the number of pounds per bale being cer-
tain the price for the whole could be easily ascertained. The court
said:
"Counsel say the price is indefinite. The price was fixed at
111/2 cents per pound .... If the thing was certain, the price is
necessarily certain. In the contract the price is clearly certain,
for what was sold was cotton of a grade not below middling,
and the middling price was fixed....
"That is certain which can be made certain; and the price
is readily ascertained.... ,,13
These two cases apparently announce different rules. Grant-
ing that in the Comford case the object of the sale was uncertain,.
could it not have been ascertained? Or are the cases to be distin-
guished on the fact in one case the thing was certain whereas in
the other it was not?
A closer analysis of the Comford case shows that the price
was never ascertained because an estimate of the number of acres
in the tract of land was never made. It is submitted that if an
129. 45 La. Ann. 502, 12 So. 763 (1893).
130. Clark v. Comford, 45 La. Ann. 502, 511, 12 So. 763, 767 (1893).
131. 147 La. 102, 84 So. 510 (1920).
132. "What was sold in each case was 100 bales of cotton of an average
weight of 515 pounds per bale . . . 'the addition of the qualifying words
"about" . . . is only for the purpose of providing against accidental varia-
tions'...




estimate of the acreage had been made, there would have been no
question but that the parties would have been bound to their
contract. The case then resolves itself to one in which the contract
depended upon the happening of a condition, which was never
accomplished, and consequently the contract never became bind-
ing. The result of the case was therefore correct but the basis on
which it was predicated, if we are to take the court literally, is
faulty unless the price is deemed uncertain when, although de-
terminable, it has not yet been determined. Such a position how-
ever cannot be accepted in view of Article 2465 and the juris-
prudence thereon according to which a price is sufficient to sup-
port a sale even if left to the arbitration of a third person. In such
cases, the price is not known with certainty; it is only determin-
able, and when so determined the sale is operative.
A similar situation exists when produce is sold presently at
future market prices. Typical contracts are those for the sale of
commodities at a price per given quantity for each cent in propor-
tion to the weekly average price of the commodity as sold on a
given market. The price ultimately depends upon the weekly av-
erage price for a given week, and while it is true that the price
has been fixed, the basic measure is not determined but merely
determinable. Yet the courts have impliedly approved such con-
tracts as valid and the question as to uncertainty has never
arisen.18 4 In Landeche Brothers Company v. New Orleans Coffee
Company,135 syrup was sold at a price "made to depend upon the
market of Y. C. Sugar," the contract stipulating that the price of
the syrup per gallon "was to be 2 times the price of Y. C. sugar
'if sugar sells at 15 cents to 20 cents per lb.' . . . and 6 times the
price of sugar if it sells for 25 cents to 30 cents." The market price
of sugar at no time during the season reached the lowest price
named in the contract, and consequently the court concluded that
the parties were not bound since under their interpretation of the
contract, "the parties did not intend to bind themselves to sell and
to buy, except on condition that the sugar sold at prices named in
the contract .... ,"136 (Italics supplied.) The court further pointed
out:
"Plaintiff's counsel in oral argument and in brief earnestly
134. LeBourgeois v. Gramercy Co., 50 La. Ann. 813, 24 So. 279 (1898);
LeBlanc v. Godchaux Co., 152 La. 405, 93 So. 201 (1922); Landeche Bros. Co. v.
New Orleans Coffee Co., 173 La. 701, 138 So. 513 (1931).
135. Ibid.
136. Landeche Bros. Co. v. New Orleans Coffee Co., 173 La. 701, 705, 138
So. 513, 515 (1931).
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contend that the contract itself shows that this was an uncon-
ditional sale.... But if it be conceded that counsel's contention
is correct, their client is in no better plight, for the reason there
was no agreement as to the price of the commodity if sugar
sold for less than 15 cents, which it did ....
It is thus clear that though the price was not definitely fixed it
was nevertheless ascertainable, and it is strongly intimated, if not
definitely stated, that the contract would have become binding on
the parties the moment the price of sugar rose to fifteen cents per
pound during the season. That the contract was subordinated to
this condition, and that such was the holding of the court, there is
no doubt; and the reason why the contract was unenforceable
was because the condition was never accomplished, not because
the price was uncertain.
It must also be noted in this case, as well as in those instances
where the price is left to the arbitrament of a third person, that
while the price is designated by the parties at the time of con-
tracting, it is not definitely known to them, but depends upon
other circumstances beyond their power or control. Clearly then,
the rule resolves itself to this: That the price is sufficiently cer-
tain within the meaning of Article 2464 when its amount, though
unknown to the parties at the time of contracting, may be ascer-
tained from other factors not within the power of the parties to
control, that is, when neither party can diminish it or augment it
at will. Accordingly, a sale for a price which depends upon cur-
rent wholesale or retail market prices on a certain date will be
good, since the price is sufficiently fixed as far as the parties are
concerned, it not being within their power to control it.18
Patton's Heirs v. Mosely,189 however, would seem to create
some doubt as to the applicability of the principle just enunciated.
That was a case involving a sale of mineral rights by the plain-
tiff's ancestor to one Roy who sold to the Acme Investment Com-
pany, which in turn sold to the defendants one of whom was a
minor at the time of the transfer. The rights conveyed were never
exercised by any of the vendees, and the plaintiffs brought suit to
clear their title alleging extinguishment of mineral rights by non-
user. Defendants contended that the prescription had been inter-
rupted by the sale from the Acme Company to the defendants one
of whom was a minor, relying on the doctrine of Sample v. Whit-
137. 173 La. at 706, 138 So. at 515.
138. See cases cited in notes 133, 134, supra.
139. 186 La. 1088, 173 So. 772 (1937).
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aker,110 but the court held that this rule was inapplicable because
the sale to the defendants was a mere simulation. The court
added:
"... the testimony shows that no cash, nor its equivalent, nor
any other consideration passed between the parties; and that
the deed was executed under a collateral agreement,... that
if the designated vendees could realize anything out of the
sale of the property, or production therefrom, they would then
pay Roy, the vendor, $1 per acre, together with one-sixth of
all sale or production derived from the property. In other,
words, the defendants were neither to pay nor to be responsi-
ble for the alleged purchase price, which was to be derived
solely from the property itself.
"Looking to the private agreement of the parties to ascer-
tain their intent and purpose, we have no difficulty in deter-
mining that there was no sale of the mineral rights. If nothing
is realized by the alleged vendors [vendees] from the sale or
production of the property, admittedly, they will pay nothing
and owe nothing to their alleged vendor...
"In the agreement between the parties, the essentials of a
sale were entirely lacking. There was not only no price agreed
to be paid, but also no certainty as to the payment of what was
agreed on, the payment being wholly conditioned on the ap-
parent vendees' realizing out of the property itself."141 (Italics
supplied.)
The position taken by the court that no price was agreed upon
is faulty for, admitting that the stated consideration was simu-
lated, the testimony showed that the price of one dollar per acre
"together with one sixth of all sale or production derived from the
property" was to be paid. A price was thus agreed upon and the
mere fact that the payment thereof was conditioned under the
vendees' exploitation of the property should not have been held
to annul the sale. What Article 2464 means, when it says that the
price must be certain, is that the price must be agreed to by the
parties and sufficiently determined by them. There is no require-
ment that there be certainty as to its payment.
The result reached cannot therefore be justified on the ground
that there was no price or that there was no certainty as to the
payment of that which was agreed upon. It may be justified, how-
140. 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931), holding that minority of co-owner sus-
pends prescription.
141. Patton's Heirs v. Moseley, 186 La. 1088, 1093, 173 So. 772, 774 (1997).
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ever, on the ground that the sale never became operative because
the condition, upon which the determination of the price de-
pended, never took place, and the ownership of the property was
never transferred to the defendant, because neither of the ven-
dees elected to exercise the rights granted.14 2 Again, it is possible
that the court may have reached the conclusion, which the facts
of the case seem to warrant, that the price was not serious and not
intended to be paid, or that it depended purely upon a circum-
stance within the power of one of the parties to control, and was
therefore uncertain.
The first solution offered finds support in the case of Wright
and Anderson v. Anthon, 143 a case which turned upon an alleged
sale of cows "for about $50 a head." The court found, and correctly
so, that the price was uncertain, but it went on to say:
"But there is another consideration which prompts us to re-
gard the sale with further doubt as to its validity. Both parties
testify that the price was to be paid after the cows would have
made enough profit as dairy cows for their new owner to pay
for themselves. A sale under such contingency might be con-
strued as one made with a suspensive condition, which, under
the provisions of article 2471 of the Civil Code 'does not trans-
fer the property to the buyer, until the fulfillment of the con-
dition'. Mrs. Anthon's testimony is to the effect that she had
not been paid anything yet on account of the purchase price,
from which it can readily be assumed that the condition had
not been fulfilled."'"
In view of the foregoing, it may be stated that the French
rules regarding certainty of price are not only applicable in Lou-
isiana, but also that they do not contravene any principles which
our better adjudicated cases have announced. The price should
be deemed certain, therefore, if it has been so sufficiently deter-
mined by the parties that the amount thereof is susceptible of as-
certainment from other factors or circumstances not within the
power of the parties to control.
C. SERIOUSNESS OF PRICE
The last two paragraphs of Article 2464 of the Civil Code pro-
vide as follows:
"It (the price) ought to be serious, that is to say, there
142. Art. 2471, La. Civil Code of 1870; Wright and Anderson v. Anthon,
19 La. App. 622, 136 So. 753 (1931).
143. 19 La. App. 622, 136 So. 753 (1931).
144. Wright and Anderson v. Anthon, 17 La. App. 622, 136 So. 753 (1931).
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should have been a serious and true agreement that it should
be paid.
"It ought not to be out of all proportion with the value of
the thing; for instance the sale of a plantation for a dollar
could not be considered as a fair sale; it would be considered
as a donation disguised."
From the nature of the conditions imposed by this article it
must be admitted the determination of the seriousness of the
price depends in the last analysis on the intention of the parties
because in order for the price to be a true price, it is necessary
that the parties propose to pay it, receive it or demand it. Taken
literally these two paragraphs seem to impose two conditions as
regards the price: (1) it must be serious, and (2) it must not be
out of all proportion to the value of the thing sold. It is therefore
important to determine whether the two paragraphs are to be
taken together to constitute one requirement, or whether they
embody two different requirements as to price, both essential to
the validity of the contract of sale.
The prevailing doctrine of "serious consideration" in Louis-
iana is deduced from the provisions of this article, with the result
that contracts are invalid unless equivalents are exchanged.145 It
is not within the scope of this paper to consider the soundness of
this theory as applied to all contracts. Pertinent, however, is a dis-
cussion of the theory as particularly applied to the contract of
sale and inquiry as to the validity of the contract when the price
paid cannot be regarded as the equivalent of the thing sold.
For a proper understanding of the provisions of the article,
a study of its origin and development is necessary and we are at
once thrown back to the Code Napoleon from which so many ar-
ticles of the Louisiana Civil Code were taken. It is noteworthy
that Article 2464 did not appear in its present form until the adop-
tion of the Civil Code of 1825. In 1808, it merely consisted of the
first two paragraphs which in substance required (1) that the price
be certain, and (2) that it be a sum of money.146 The correspond-
ing Code Napoleon article on the other hand, consists only of the
first paragraph of our article and merely requires that the price
be fixed and determined by the parties.4" But despite the appar-
145. Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906).
146. La. Civil Code of 1808, 1.11, pp. 346, 347 [Compiled Edition of the Civil
Codes of Louisiana, at Art. 2464, 3 La. Legal Archives, Part II (1942) 13581.
147. Art. 1591, French Civil Code [Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of
Louisiana, at Art. 2464, 3 La. Legal Archives, Part II (1942) 1358]: "Ie prix de la
vente doit 6tre determind et designd par les parties."
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ent insufficiency of the Napoleonic articles, French courts and
jurists found that other requisites were also necessary to consti-
tute a valid price; requirements which did not have to be stated
since they were necessarily implied from the nature of the con-
tract itself. Thus it was concluded that the price ought to be seri-
ous, for without it there could be no sale, the price being an es-
sential element of the contract. 4 '
It is significant also that in the Spanish Civil Code nothing is
said with regard to the seriousness of the price. As pointed out by
Manresa, however, this does not mean that this requirement can
be eliminated, because a price means of course a price which is
real and intended to be paid, since a false or simulated price is not
in reality a price.14 9 The question as to when the price was or was
not serious became of primary importance. It was universally
recognized that the price was not serious when (1) the price stip-
ulated was fictitious, that is, when the parties had clearly in-
tended that it should not be paid, and (2) when the disproportion
with the value of the thing was such that the parties could not
have regarded it as the motive for the contract, as for example,
when a plantation of considerable value was sold for a crown. 1 0
A minority of French jurists listed a third instance in which
the price was deemed not to be serious, namely when it was small
enough to warrant the inference that the parties, could not have
regarded it as the equivalent of the thing sold."' The great ma-
jority of the French authorities, however, exploded this theory,
maintaining that the mere fact of a much inferior price did not
affect the validity of the sale; that a price, no matter how inferior,
would support a sale provided that the parties had contracted in
contemplation thereof, and that if at all, such a price would only
offer grounds for rescission under the articles on lesion. The argu-
ment was that, if a sale was null because the price, although in-
tended by the parties as the cause for the transfer, was not
deemed the equivalent of'the thing sold, the provisions of the le-
* sion articles which give the vendor the faculty of rescinding the
transaction, would be rendered nugatory. The mere fact that the
148. See authorities cited in note 151, infra.
149. 10 Manresa, op. cit. supra note 36, at 38(a).
150. 1 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 122, at 12, 13, nos 19-21. Authorities cited
in note 151, infra.
151. See 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 29, at 14, n. 26, § 349; 6
Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 30, at 186. The authorities entertaining this view
seem to have abandoned it in favor of the validity of the contract of sale
even when the price is not the equivalent of the thing sold. See 4 Zachariae,
Le Droit Civil Frangais (4 ed. 1858) 271, § 675.
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price was much inferior to the value of the thing should not of it-
self be sufficient to nullify the sale. It may have been that the
vendor was mistaken as to the value of the thing which he sold,
or that he was pressed by circumstances to sell for any price
which was offered. If such was the case, it could not be said that
the price was not serious, for it was evident that the sale had
been made in all earnest and in consideration of the price stated,
however disproportionate it was to the value of the thing.15 2
Manresa, in his commentaries to the Spanish Civil Code
makes the following observation:
"We have said that the price is economic equivalent of the
thing sold. Now, if we examine closely any contract of sale,
the amount of the price and all the factors that determine the
value of the thing sold, and try to establish the relation be-
tween both elements, weighing and debating if such economic
equivalent is given, what is done, in substance, is to examine
the justness of the price, that is, to determine if the price is or
is not a just price. But without going into such an extensive
examination, as we might do at first, there are cases in which
the enormous disproportion that exists between those eco-
nomic values is plain. It is no longer a case in which the price
is lower than the average, or smaller than the lowest; but a
case of an insignificant price. This derisive price, the unbe-
lievable quantum of which at once discloses its non-existence,
is the false or simulated price. But the reason why it is so
classified must be perfectly understood. It is so classified, not
merely because of the disproportion between its value and
that of the thing sold, that is, not because of the lesion that the
vendor may have suffered, even though it be beyond the fifth,
or the fourth, or the half of the value of the thing sold, but
because its insignificance 'denotes its falsity, its non-exist-
ence." 158
Thus, the better authority in France and Spain is that the
price is not serious when the parties have expressly intended that
it should not be paid, or when the price named is so out of pro-
portion to the value of the thing that it is evident that they could
152. 2 Baudry-Lacantineiie, op. cit. supra note 106, at 339, no 747; 19 Bau-
dry-Lacantinerie et Saignat, op. cit. supra note 16, at 128, 129, no 130; 1 Guil-
louard, op. cit. supra note 36, at 114, no 96; 10 Huc, op. cit. supra nbte 29, at
55-57, nos 34-35; 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 29, at 88-95, nos 79-87; 6 Mar-
cad6, op. cit. supra note 30, at 186; 2 Planlol, op. cit. supra note 64, at 516, no
1375; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 16, at 29, no 35; 5 Troplong, op.
cit. supra note 32, at 193 et seq., no 150; 4 Zachariae, loc. cit. supra note 150.
153. 10 Manresa, op. cit. supra note 36, at 40.
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only have indicated it in jest and without regarding it as part of
the bargain.
It may well be therefore that in the last two paragraphs of
our Article 2464, the redactors sought to codify the French doc-
trine as to the seriousness of the price; that is, that there should
be a true and serious agreement that it should be paid, and that it
should not be so out of proportion to the value of the thing to war-
rant the inference that the parties did not regard it as part of the
contract. If so, the last two paragraphs of Article 2464 explain
what is meant by a serious price, and do not establish a norm for
adequateness of price. That this was the intention of the drafters
of the code is substantiated by the inclusion of Article 1860 and
following, which clearly indicate that a price much inferior to the
value of the thing sold does not make the contract void. And yet,
the opposite result would follow if the doctrine of serious consid-
eration were applied to the contract of sale.1'54
However, our courts have interpreted Article 2464 as requir-
ing that in addition to being serious the price must be in propor-
tion to the value of the thing sold. In Saunders v. Busch-Everett
Company'"' the court speaks of Article 2464 as follows:
"It provides that the price should be certain, that it should
consist of money, that it should be serious; that is to say, that
it should not be a mere pretended price the payment of which
is not contemplated; and that it should not be out of all pro-
portion to the value of the thing. In this instance the price,
paid at the signing of the contracts ... was $276.72 ... all in
strict accordance with the terms of the contract. The price, (if
the transaction is regarded as a sale) was therefore certain.
It was paid in money. And, having been actually so paid, it
can not be said that it was not serious, within the meaning of
154. Art. 1860, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Lesion is the injury suffered by
one who does not receive a full equivalent for what he gives in a commuta-
tive contract. The remedy given for this injury, is founded on its being the
effect of implied error or imposition; for, in every commutative contract,
equivalents are supposed to be given and received."
Art. 1861, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The law, however, will not release a
person of full age, and who is under no incapacity, against the effect of his
voluntary contracts, on account of such implied error or imposition, except in
the two following cases: (1) In partition .... (2) in sales of immovable prop-
erty, the vendor may be relieved, if the price given is less than one-half of
the value of the thing sold; but the sale can not be invalidated for lesion to
the injury of the purchaser."
Art. 1862, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Lesion can be alleged by persons of
full age in no other sale than one for immovables, in which is included what-
ever is immovable by destination."
155. 138 La. 1049, 71 So. 153 (1916).
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the article to which we have referred. Nor do we think it can
be said to have been out of all proportion to the value of the
'thing' for which it was paid, according to the standard estab-
lished by the illustration contained in that article ....
At least in one case, however, the court was of the opinion
that the vileness of the price is not sufficient to declare a sale void.
In Howe v. Powell1'5 the court stated, by way of dictum:
"The record shows that the price of the sale was $460; that pos-
session was never delivered to Kleinert, but continued in Coch-
ran, and since 1878 has been in the defendants; and the admis-
sion is that the value of the property exceeds $2500. The price
is about one sixth of the value. It is a vile price. Had the sale
been a real one in the intention of the parties, the vendors
would have had the right to demand its rescission for lesion
beyond moiety... ."158
Nevertheless, it must be noted that though the above statement
was dictum, it had a strong bearing on the outcome of the case
since the decision rested on the rule that a redeemable sale for an
inadequate consideration and unaccompanied by delivery of the
thing sold, is treated as a security contract, unless otherwise
proved.
It is submitted, therefore, that whatever be the status of the
"serious consideration doctrine" as applied to other contracts, it
certainly should have no application to the contract of sale.159 If
the price is vile, that is, much inferior to the value of the thing,
the vendor has his remedy under the provisions of Articles 1860-
1863, and then only within the limits provided for by those and
other articles on the same subject matter. 16
It might be argued that, following the minority of the French
authorities, the redactors intended to adopt the view that the
price must also be the equivalent of the thing sold; but, as has
been seen, it is doubtful that such was their intention in view of
the existence of our articles on lesion.
A compromise might be suggested whereby an equivalent
156. 138 La. 1049, 1070, 71 So. 153, 160 (1916).
157. 40 La. Ann. 307, 4 So. 450 (1888). See also Rudolph v. Gerdy, 121 La.
477, 46 So. 589 (1908) (sale for an annuity less than the revenues of the prop-
erty sold; held in accordance with majority of French commentators that the
price was serious and not derisive).
158. Howe v. Powell, 40 La. Ann. 307, 310, 4 So. 450, 451 (1888).
159. See Snellings, Cause and Consideration in Louisiana (1934) 8 Tulane
L. Rev. 178, 206 et seq.




would be required in cases to which the action for lesion is inap-
plicable, but this would be straining the construction of Article
2464 which governs all contracts of sale, whether affecting mov-
able or immovable property.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that more importance should be attached to the
question of determining the true nature of contracts for the trans-
fer of property, not only from the point of view of the formalities
and the capacity of the parties, but also, and more particularly,
from the point of view of the risk involved in each transaction;
and that more emphasis should be placed upon the money require-
ment for the validity of a contract of sale.
Although the strict requirement as to price certainty would
seem to restrict the sale transaction so as to render it ineffective
for all the needs of modern business to transfer the property in
goods and merchandise, it is submitted that the codal articles of
the Louisiana law of sale are sufficiently broad to include any
modern devices regarding the fixing of the price, provided that the
final determination thereof is not left to depend upon the whim
or caprice of one of the parties.
It is also to be noted that the requirement as to the adequate-
ness of the consideration, as announced in Murray v. Barnhart,61
should have no application to a sale contract and that the exclu-
sive criterion as to the seriousness of the price should be the in-
tention of the parties.
161. 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906).
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